valery legasov tapes transcript

Then, no organisation would take on the development of an unconventional compressor or an unconventional, say, heat exchanger, again driven by the lack of needed material or experience. For some reason, this was not accepted. As far as I can imagine, but this is within my ability, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, I spoke with him three times. And the requirements they created were not ideal, not the ones that had to be created to make nuclear energy safer, but rather they were coming from the current situation that we had here, and from some Western experiences. And so, along with a lot of very accurate depictions and comments, there were a lot of inaccuracies. So, I heard his first call When I worked with Shcherbina, I never heard him speaking to Gorbachev. He praised nuclear energy, praised himself, praised his own Ministry, and said in passing, at Chernobyl, we have had a signal. Lev Petrovich Feoktistov, a very intelligent and talented man, was given the responsibility of matters of nuclear physics and its special practical applications. We arrived at the building of the city party committee in the central square. How? These were rare cases, but they did happen. In practice, this then turned out to be the best decision, as all the wells had been built and the measuring wells showed that there was practically no penetration of contaminated water into the ground. That is why I provided some sort of patronage for these areas, well, whatever I could provide within the bounds of the Institutes authority. Military acceptance was also extensive in our industry, so the quality of the equipment was high grade . The question arose about what to do with the 5th and 6th blocks. Adamovich: I see, so on the 2nd of May [Unclear]. And they estimated the escaped fuel by the activity within their measured points. It was either graphite or some metallic construction at a very high temperature. What he is as a person and why he was in shock there but there, he was an incapacitated man. You must always do something new, and be very critical to what was done before you. This is a very obvious scenario. But, at night, everyone gathered at the Ministry of Energy. Legasov: Reported on what is being done. I said the same to them but how can one get access to Gorbachev for a back-and-forth. In Chernobyl, I met highly organized, very precise young people who fulfilled the tasks assigned to them in the best possible manner, and these tasks were not easy. After Rizhkov and Ligachev arrived on the site, as I have already said but I will repeat myself, the original GC left. In this reactor, 1,700 tons. But when Silayev replaced Shcherbina, and I was left, then the entire Commission, the first composition of it, left. And these non-traditional dynamic localisation methods for possible accidents at such facilities need to be thought about by us today, well, mainly by the Soviet community because it is our problem; although we would happily cooperate internationally for this task. It has everything. Here, the doctors have a lot of information and, I think, Vladimir Fyodorovich knows it well. He regularly found proper solutions when one or the other difficult situation arose. Instead, each time it was a response to some technical proposal, or to some accident, or to some pre-accident situation. But in reality, due to a lack of understanding of this whole philosophy, they are worsening the condition of the device. Because I already spoke at the Politburo once. Sensors for radiation fields, sensors that could measure the composition of gas at various locations in the Chernobyl NPP. The journey was gloomy. The heat was absorbed and it broke down into magnesium oxide and carbon dioxide, which in turn reduced the supply of oxygen, as it is in firefighting. Since Ive already started talking about the army, then I must say that from the moment when the Soviet Army was charged with organizing the work, the scope of work was quite extensive, but the deployed chemical forces first had to scout and establish the contaminated area. Valery Legassov transcriptions from his tapes, 100% found this document useful, Mark this document as useful, 0% found this document not useful, Mark this document as not useful, Save Valery Legassov transcriptions For Later, Recording number 1 of 5 of Valery Legasov, Still, all my life I did not think that I would have to go to such, at least the age, in, which I am now, having just experienced my fiftieth birthday, to essentially refer, to a memoir part of something, a part of a tragic, in many ways confused and, But there have been such events, such a scale and such participation of. That was true indeed. In the tapes,. He discovered. But, at the same time, they didnt report other things like the appearance of typical radiation injuries and so on. It is difficult to overestimate the work of the supply group, which was organised by the chairman of the of the Gossnab of Ukraineworking on behalf of Vitaliy Andreyevich Solov, the chairman of Gosplan of Ukrainewho, sitting in Kiev, worked miracles to ensure that all the work was carried out in Chernobyl with all the needed materials even though the amount needed was, of course, ridiculous. For example, dolomite. For example, the status of contamination on the roofs of buildings of the 3rd and 4th blocks was measured many times. The work of the Government Commission (GC) during the first days was as follows. Talk about the various organizations that are involved both on the site and in their offices; about the medical radiology centre that has been created there. Prezi. And so he sought our help all the time on what to do. Legasov: Hope this isnt confusing to you. This colossal task was organized; even now it is hard to imagine how. And there never was a caseand there were many such occasions [when soldiers were asked to help]where someone, as they say, remained in the ranks, and did not step forward to help us carry out various, sometimes very difficult, tasks. in Law, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Graduated 2022) 3 y Related I recall, perhaps, only one statement by Professor Ivanov from Moscow Engineering-Physics Institute. But sadly, no proper scientific analysis of the actual situation took place to analyze all the possible problems and find ways to avoid them. Say they allowed it and some cars left, some of the residents left in their own cars, but the cars were, of course, contaminated. [7], Excessive hierarchy has always been contraindicated for science, it stifles it. Do you understand? ", "Responsabilites Occidentales Dans les Consequences Sanitaires de la Catastrophe de Tchernobyl, en Bielorussie, Ukraine et Russie", "Western responsibility regarding the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia", "Chernobyl scientist's suicide described", " - .. They gathered at the table and doled out houses and posts to themselves. All of this reflected a certain general serious technological inefficiency and indiscipline in almost all crucial areas of our work. The decisions were made on the 26th of April, and carried out from that day through the 2nd of May. Which button to press, how long to wait, what to do. This general downfall of Soviet technology, the reasons for which can be discussed extensively and for a long time, it was simultaneously the beginning of Chernobyl. But to make it the primary method of work based on that, it was absolutely obvious that this was impossible. Also worrying was the fact that it was an isolated Soviet line of development. He was not in Moscow at the time but in another region where he was leading a Communist party asset meeting. It is now sometimes said that many of those firemen received needlessly high radiation doses, because they were stationed in various places to monitor the situation and prevent the appearance of new fires. An appropriate team was gathered at night and approximately within three to four hours, they departed to the site. It had high temperatures which meant that we could use it in metallurgy, chemistry and oil refining. Boris Yevdokimovich probably made a mistake but it is hard to say. The logic behind the adopted decisions was as follows. The iron would oxidize and the temperatures would rise further still. And people understand that they are dangerous. Especially after I saw the Loviisa station in Finland which was built according to our principles; it was basically our station. So this issue was somewhat resolved. I invited two or three experienced journalists to it. But in the end, I have to say this. This is Previous: led strip light 5630 5730 12v 5m waterproof stripe flexible diode tape 300led cold white warm whit It came down to this that the research group from the Institute of Nuclear Energy together with experts (this group was successively led by experts such as Yury Vasilievich Svincev, Anatoly Mihailovich Polevoi, Tutnov as I have already said; next this group was led by comrade Kuharkin Nikolai Evgenievich. For example, different groups in June provided different estimates of the radioactivity that had escaped reactor number 4. I can't find any factual mention of the tapes being hidden. I heard often that specialists, Kramerov Aleksander Yakovlevich in particular, while discussing these problems with Anatoly Petrovich Aleksandrov, made proposals to the [reactor] designer to change the accident protection system (APS), to improve the APS of this device, and they were not rejected. Legasov: was to prevent 2,500 degrees. He was outside Moscow, was at this time in one of the regions of, the country, conducting a party-economic asset there. All these instances were in our heads as individual episodes. But this reactor was not considered bad because of safety reasons. And this could have happened a few years ago. Section 3, (V) Public interest work\" and is for educational purpose only.If this video infringes your rights, please email us at dubcraftnlhd@gmail.com. But this had not been done before and the device worked with values of positive reactivity coefficients much higher than a beta in the first place. And for the last 20 years, he spoke wherever he could, at the Politburo, etc. Eventually all came to the following number: between 3% to 4% of the fuel was thrown out of reactor number 4 reactor. These were the questions we had. The show opens with Legasov's suicide, on the second anniversary of the explosion. The medics did not sign the protocol. First, for higher fuel consumption; for higher capital costs; and for a non-industrial basis of its construction. A few words about the conditions in which the Government Commission had been functioning. We could only kick ourselves for not having external automatic dosimetry devices set up around the station, that would record the telemetry about radiation conditions within, say, 1 km, 2 km, 4 km and 10 km radius. But not in the accident itself. It was clear that during such migrations there was no command centre prepared from which it would be possible to organise the work in such difficult conditions. Why does he hide them? The system for warning the Ministry of Energy about an accident was adopted beforehand, long before the accident. Not only were the decontamination tasks performed incredibly quickly, the construction of the new residential villages, where the evacuees were moved, was also incredibly quick. To this day, I haven't heard of a single case where contaminated water had to be pumped out. If there is a danger of a person receiving a dose of 25 rem immediately or within a certain amount of time, then the local authorities have the right tohave the right to but are not required tocarry out an evacuation. How should the work be planned and organised? And it complicated my relationship with the Ministry when I tried to, not very carefully, speak out on this issue. From that moment the Government Commission became only an administrative mechanism for that huge government work that was done under the control of the Operative group of the CCCPSU. Generally, one of their tasks was to put various sensors in reactor number 4 for measuring gamma fields, neutron fields, measuring temperature, measuring airflow, measuring the hydrogen concentration sensors should it suddenly appear in the system, etc. The scale of the work, how all the organizations and the government itself perceived it. It took away the heat so that the uranium wont melt. The composition included heads of the main institutions associated with the work around Chernobyl and also leading experts, such as academician Sokolov, academician Mikhalevich and academician Trefilov, who were associated with particular tasks of ecological or technical nature related to the liquidation of the consequences of the accident. This was how I first heard from the reactor people who spoke about serious things in a calm, matter-of-fact manner, that our modern nuclear energy based on VVER and RBMK is dangerous and requires additional serious measures to be taken. And now it appears that it is impossible to make the rods move that fast after all. Even more actually because nasty isotopes would spread, much heavier than caesium that we mentioned earlier. This all had some psychological effect on Ivan Stepanovich Silaev and he authorized the works. All the troubles will be restricted to the area. [7] Legasov developed a plan to extinguish the reactor fire using nitrogen gas pumped throughout the plant's pipe network but the pipes were too badly damaged to be effective. He was assigned to compile a report for the International Atomic Energy Agency about the causes and aftermath of the accident. Unfortunately, there was no local broadcasting network to announce this. I remember an episode well when we, with General Kuncevich, arrived at Pripyat. [7] Legasov was impressed by the operation of the KGB in the area but considered the Civil Defence group to be in shambles. Another set of tasks was performed by the construction experts from the Ministry of Energy who were building a temporary village called Green Cape (Zelyoniy Mis). Altogether, there was such a lengthy argument and Shcherbina, to his credit, approved the decision to evacuate. 1 is a fire; 2 is radiation damage; 3 is a nuclear accident; 4 is a chemical hazard. He was in shock all of the time. Well because it was already clear in the 60s that it would be expensive and practically impossible to develop industry in the European part and provide it with electricity from organic sources. The time but in another region where he was not in Moscow at the same to them how! He authorized the works where he was in shock there but there, spoke..., how long to wait, what to do with the Ministry when I tried to not. Basis of its construction with the Ministry when I tried to, very. Heard his first call when I worked with Shcherbina, I think, Vladimir Fyodorovich knows it.... 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